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Sincemany years, the training of imams has been put at the center of the policy agenda in
several European countries. Because in Belgium religion classes are part of the com-
pulsory program of pupils, the training of imams is coupled with the training of professors
of religion. Recently, proposals to organize these trainings by universities have been
submitted to the political arena. These proposals aim at introducing, on the one hand,
classes of French andDutch languages and, on the other hand, classes on Belgian society
and legislations. As such an issue is under the competence of regions, debates and pro-
posals diverge significantly in Flanders and in the French-speaking part of the country.
The paper analyzes the challenges for dealing with this issue in the two parts of the
country. It analyzes the positions, the controversies and the proposals of state and non-
state actors involved in this debate. The author stresses how the state plans to organize
these trainings and how the state justifies its intervention in an issue that is usually a
domain of competence of the hierarchy of the “Church” or the self-organization of the
Islam.
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germe.ulb.ac.be) and the Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the
Universit libre de Bruxelles. His research interests focus on the integration of migrants
on the labour market, the political participation of ethnic minorities, the European
policies of immigration and integration and the European border control policies.
Introduction
For many years, the training of Muslim leaders (imams, teachers of Islamic reli-
gious education,Muslim counselors) has been on the political agenda in Belgium.
At present no training program for Muslim leaders has been formulated by the
representative body of the Muslim faith, the Muslim Executive of Belgium
(MEB), or submitted by them for recognition by the public authorities. It follows
that in the absence of such a program, the Muslim community has no institutions
for the purpose of leadership training, unlike other recognized religions and
secularist organizations. The lack of this instrument creates an unjustified in-
equality between the religions and, in addition, contributes to a climate of sus-
picion and distrust on the part of the public authorities towards some imams, who
are considered as potentially able to feed the growth of fundamentalism. In order
to respond to this problematic situation, the Belgian state has taken initiative to
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bring leadership training programs into existence in collaboration with theMEB.
The question of the legitimacy of state involvement immediately arises given that
the Belgian Constitution guarantees the separation of state and religion.
This paper puts forward an analysis of howMuslim leadership training is being
developed in Belgium. The analysis describes the model put in place and the path
that led to the current situation, as well as explaining the main factors that led to
this particular outcome. Given that the question of training is dependent on the
relationship between the state and religions, the paper will first of all analyze this
relationship and the specific question of the recognition of theMuslim faith. It will
then analyze how the state has been able to justify its involvement by exploiting
the possibilities offered by the Constitution and the organizational weaknesses of
the Muslim communities.
The main thesis is that Belgian state intervention in the training of Imams and
teachers of Islamic religious education is justified primarily by a logic of security
that treats training for imams as an instrument to combat Muslim fundamen-
talism, guarantee public order and help to build an European Islam. It is thus
control, rather than the improved educational standards, themain objective of the
policy. Other factors contributing to state intervention are the climate of Islam-
ophobia, fragmentation of theMuslim community and the weak leadership of the
officially recognized representation of Muslims, the Muslim Executive of Bel-
gium.
This analysis touches upon the issue of institutional responses to religious
diversity in three ways. Firstly, the analysis recognizes that the institutional ar-
rangements between the state and religious communities are key in shaping the
national response to the problematic of training Imams. Secondly, the paper pays
close attention to the institutions that represent the Muslim community and how
the specific form of institutionalization that emerged in Belgium influences the
policy on training of imams. Thirdly, the paper also highlights how the particular
solution chosen impacts on institutions of the host society, in particular the uni-
versity, which acquires an important role as a co-producer of the new policy
together with the state, Islamic associations and the Muslim leadership. At the
end, governments at the federal and regional level set upCommissionsmade up of
representatives of Muslim communities, representatives of the universities, and
experts showing the central role played by meso-level institutions on this issue.
1. The relationship between religions and the state in Belgium
In 1831, the Constituent Assembly settled the basis for the politics of religion in
Belgium. The Belgian constitution establishes freedom of religion and of public
worship (article 19), and also the freedom not to practice any religion (article 20).
It also provides for the independence of religion in respect of the state (article 16),
specifically by forbidding the state to interfere in the appointment of ministers of
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religion or to prevent correspondence between ministers of religion and their
superiors. In terms of finance, article 181 of the Constitution provides that salaries
and pensions of ministers of religion are paid by the state and registered annually
in its budget. This measure was taken to compensate for the confiscation of goods
from the Catholic Church during the revolutionary period and for the abolition of
various sources of income, which had previously been paid to the Church. Apart
from this, the communes took financial responsibility for the maintenance of
religious buildings (Catholic churches, synagogues and Protestant churches).
The model chosen is both close to and distant from the French Concordat of
1801. It is relatively close in its acceptance that the “social utility of religion” (de
Coorebyter 2005) consists essentially in themaintenance of the established order.
However, the model is distant from the French Concordat because the latter set
up mechanisms of control of religion which were not copied in Belgium (Tihon
2005). The young Belgian state thus put in place a relatively generous funding
system, but without attaching means of control as the State does not control the
Church expenditure, which made the system completely original for its time
(Sägesser / de Coorebyter 2000). This particular system resulted from the unionist
spirit at the time of independence between the twomain pillars (Lijphart 1981) of
the Belgian state: liberals, who were essentially secularist, and Catholics. So, from
the beginning, the young Belgian state funded religion in the framework of a
policy aiming to guarantee social order, reinforce public morality, and build re-
spect for the law, property, goods and persons (de Coorebyter 2005). In return,
recognized religions were protected and funded. With this model, Belgium
avoided choosing between a state-controlled, state-financed Church and a free
Church with no public funding.
The recognition of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religions predated in-
dependence. The Anglican religion was recognized at the time of the adoption of
the law of 4thMarch 1870 which distinguished between the temporal and spiritual
aspects of a religion. Only the temporal aspect of a religion is officially recognized
and financed by the state. Although there is no law establishing the conditions for
a religion to be recognized, four criteria are traditionally used by the state: a)
having a minimum number of adherents, b) being structured in such a way as to
have a representative body which can represent the religion concerned in its
relationswith the state, c) being established in the country for a sufficient length of
time and d) being of social benefit and not carrying out any activities which are
harmful to public order (Sägesser / de Coorebyter 2000).
The representative body is responsible for the temporal administration of the
religion. Founded principally on the institutional structure of the Catholic
Church, the criteria of having a representative body poses problems to religions
which are less centralized than Catholicism. It is expected of the representative
body that it should bring together as many as possible of the local communities of
the religion concerned. The recognition of religions has therefore led the Prot-
estants and the Jews to create administrative structures allowing contact with the
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public authorities, the Administrative Council of the Protestant and Evangelical
Religion and the Jewish Central Consistory of Belgium, respectively.
This model of organization of the relations between religions and the state has
continued without fundamental change up to the present, showing a strong sali-
ence of path dependency (Piersons 1994). The funding of religions has been or-
ganized on the basis of instruments created in the early 19th century. The recog-
nition of new religions such as Islam in 1974,Orthodoxy in 1985 andmore recently
the financing of secularist organizations in 1993 extended the model. Never-
theless, a change took place following the Schools Pact of 1958. Article 24 of the
Constitution, as interpreted in a law of 1959, provides that public schools must
offer pupils the choice, throughout the whole of their compulsory education, of
classes in any one of the recognized religions or in non-confessional ethics. The
representative body of each religion is to put forward to the state its nominations
of teachers of religious education.
Thus, each religionmust have a representative body, whose principal tasks are:
a) to nominateministers of religion, religious counselors (to hospitals, prisons, the
army etc.), teachers and inspectors of religious education, etc. (Beumier 2006 and
Sägesser 2012); to organize training for these various professional groups, b) to
put forward local communities (churches, mosques, etc.) to the public authorities
for recognition, and c) to validate the religious education program.
In 2001, Belgian federalism also went through a change in the division of
powers between different levels of government. The federal state has jurisdiction
firstly over the recognition of religions and their representative bodies and sec-
ondly over the creation of paid positions for ministers of religion, also over their
salaries and pensions and those of delegates from secularist organizations. The
regions have jurisdiction over the recognition of places of worship (churches,
mosques, etc.). Communes (for Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Angli-
canism) and provinces (for Islam and Orthodoxy) make financial contributions
for the maintenance of places of worship and provide housing for ministers of
religion. To coordinate the recognition of places of worship by the region and the
creation of paid positions for ministers of religion at federal level, consultation
mechanisms have been put into place between the different levels of government.
There is thus a degree of consensus in Belgium regarding, on the one hand, the
social utility of “communities of conviction”, whether religious or not, as a means
of moral and spiritual support for the population; and on the other hand, the
principle of public funding for these communities. As for the dimension of “public
order”, this has become increasingly important since the end of the twentieth
century. The primary concern is no longer Catholicism, as it was in the nineteenth
century, but Islam. The Belgian legal framework has allowed the recognition of
Islam and its integration using existing policy instruments, without the need to
search for newmethods of intervention. At the same time, Islam has had to adapt
to integrate into the system: the organization of Muslim communities, the iden-
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tification and specific role of ministers of religion, the contribution to social co-
hesion and to “religious peace”.
2. The recognition of Islam
The recognition of Islam was established by law on 19 July 1974. However, the
institutionalization of the recognition of Islam was slow to take effect. An oper-
ating subsidy was not granted to a representative body of Islam until the mid-
1990s and the first salaries for imams were not paid until 2006, which was also the
year that the first mosques were officially recognized. Only the organization of
Islamic religious education in public schools was achieved rapidly, from 1975–
1976. The time elapsed from the recognition of Islam to the implementation of
that recognition is largely due to the wide diversity of Muslim communities and
the mutual distrust between these communities and the government. As in other
countries (Fetzer / Soper 2005; Husson / Dury 2006; Potz / Wieshaider 2004), the
Belgian authorities have been confronted with the difficulty of identifying a
representative and uncontested interlocutor for the variousMuslim communities.
From the beginning, the question of the recognition of a representative body
for the Muslim religion has been at the heart of the political debate (Kanmaz
2002; Sägesser / Torrekens 2008). The state has found it very difficult not to exceed
its authority in thematter. In 1978, the state granted the temporal management of
the religion to the Islamic and Cultural Center (ICC), the main interlocutor with
Belgian public authorities well before the official recognition of Islam. This in-
stitution played a central role in the organization of the first Islamic religious
education classes in public schools. Despite being the product of diplomatic
agreements between Belgium and Saudi Arabia, the ICC was distrusted by the
political parties due to its joining theWorld Islamic League in 1982 and due to the
fear of Islam which became widespread in public opinion during the 1980ns
(Bastenier / Dassetto 1987). In 1985, the Minister of Justice, Jean Gol, drew up a
Royal Decree creating a High Council of Muslims for Belgium, to be responsible
for the temporal management of Islamic communities. The objective of this law
was to replace the Islamic and Cultural Center, which was too controversial and
unrepresentative, by a body which would be representative of Islam in Belgium.
This proposed legislation was rejected by the Council of State because the
Constitution does not authorize the government to act on its own authority to
create an institution responsible for representing believers (Blaise / de Coore-
byter 1993).
In 1989, the Royal Commissariat on Immigrant Policy (RCIP) was set up to
give advice on an inclusive integration policy. In its first report, the RCIP (1989)
proposed the creation of a democratically elected and representative organization
for Islam in Belgium which would be the interlocutor with the state. This High
Council of Muslims for Belgium should be made up of representatives elected
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through themosques and coopted representatives. This proposal, which provoked
much controversy, was not adopted by the government. In March 1990, the gov-
ernment relieved the Islamic and Cultural Center of its powers to nominate
teachers of religious education and in June 1990 it created aProvisional Council of
Elders to serve for two years. This council was given the task of submitting a
proposal to the government for the creation of a representative leadership body.
The state was able to create this council because the council was not itself a
leadership body but a kind of consultative council of which the members ap-
pointed by the government were more representative of the lobby groups of
Belgian society rather than the diversity of Muslims in Belgium (Renaerts 1996).
This council was never accepted byMuslims. An important task of the council was
the handling of urgent business, especially the nomination of teachers of religious
education. On this matter, there was a marked difference of views between the
Moroccans and the Turks. The former preferred to nominate people settled in
Belgium, whereas the latter preferred to bring teachers from Turkey, thereby
following the approach of the Diyanet, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs.
Meanwhile, the Islamic and Cultural Center was not inactive. On the basis of
the proposal of the RCIP, it established an electoral procedure for the selection of
religious representatives through the mosques. 300 000 Muslims participated in
this process. The elections were held in January 1991, but their results were not
valid because the state did not recognize the process as this will be explained later.
Nevertheless, it gave rise to the creation of a High Council of Muslims which was
not recognized as interlocutor by the state. In spite of this lack of recognition and
the absence of controls of the electoral procedure, the authorities could not
completely ignore this process of self-organization.
The Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR),
which succeeded theRCIP, found away through the impasse in 1993. They opened
negotiations between the main factions of Islam in Belgium to enable the for-
mation of a Constituent assembly, an authority which the faithful would be able to
recognize as legitimate (Blaise 1998). It was set up in the spring of 1993 and was
made up of 51 people. It elected a Muslim Executive of Belgium (MEB) of 17
people who, after the Minister of Justice gave approval for each of the individual
members, was recognized by the government in 1994. The project was therefore
built from the bottom up, but with steering and controls by the state, and the
essential involvement of a broker (Kingdon 1984), the CEOOR. This MEB co-
existed with the High Council of Muslims created by the elections organized by
the Islamic andCultural Center in 1991. The latter ceased its activities particularly
because its president became the president of the MEB. This body nominated
teachers of religious education as well as religious counselors for hospitals and
prisons. Its work was monitored by the CEOOR.
On 12 June 1998, the Council of Ministers adopted the proposal to organize
elections for the appointment of a new Muslim Executive of Belgium. These
elections took place on 13 December 1998. An Assembly of 51 elected members
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and 17 co-opted members was to be established and to elect an executive, which
was recognized as the leadership body. All Muslims resident in Belgium for more
than a year were allowed to register on the electoral lists. The voting was carried
out either in a mosque or in a public institution. The candidates were required to
be at least 25 years old, to be resident in Belgium for at least five years, to enjoy
civil rights, to know one of the official languages of the country, and not to be
appointed to any political or diplomatic role. In addition, they were required to
have a high school diploma. Of the 72 000 registered on the electoral lists, 42 000
cast a vote. The result of the elections was confirmed on 9 January 1999 and in
February a new Muslim Executive of Belgium of 17 members (7 Moroccans, 4
Turks, 3 other nationalities, and 3 converts) was proposed to the Minister of
Justice. However one of the elected Moroccans was turned down following an
unfavorable decision by State Security. The screening imposed by the state
brought aboutmuch ill feeling amongMuslims, especially since there was no legal
basis whatsoever for the screening and the criteria applied were never explained.
Since this security check had no legal basis, a new law was adopted on 3May 2005
establishing procedures for a security check of members of theMuslim Executive
of Belgium, showing once again the security dimension inherent to this specific
policy. Further elections took place in 2005, in a climate of intense conflict be-
tween opposing currents at the heart of the Muslim community. The call for a
boycott of these elections, predominantly on the Moroccan side, led to a strong
overrepresentation of Turks among those elected to the new MEB. To avoid the
errors of the past and consolidate the achievements of the executive, the electoral
process in 2014 was based on a different procedure, closer to that used by the
Protestant and Jewish religions. A charter of affiliation to the process of renewal
was submitted to the 292mosques in the country, and they all ratified it1. Of those,
284 sent delegates to the General Council of Muslims in Belgium. This General
Council appointed 60 members to the General Assembly, who in turn appointed
15 members of the Executive, who co-opted two extra members. The new exec-
utive has been in place since 30 March 2014.
3. Conditions of institutionalization
How was the transition achieved from the dramatization of finding a Muslim
representative body to its institutionalization? The initial problem resided in the
lack of a religious hierarchy in Islam and the need for the state to have an inter-
locutor. However, the international and diplomatic approach whereby the state
gave the role of leadership body to the Islamic and Cultural Center delayed the
1 See “Projet de Renouvellement de lnOrgane Repre´sentatif du Culte Musulman en
Belgique (ORCMB)” dated May 2010 – http://mediation.blogs.lalibre.be/media/02/00/
1782274688.pdf (24 July 2015).
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creation of a grouping or federation ofmosques, in summary the self-organization
of Islam in Belgium. At the same time, the fragmentation of local Muslim com-
munities made an international resolution of the matter seem attractive. The
mosques, through their diversity and weak organization, allowed the Islamic and
Cultural Center to have the monopoly of contact with the Belgian authorities.
When the state in 1990 removed the body it had appointed in the absence of an
alternative, it never considered allowing Muslims to put together a leadership
body autonomously, and this was for reasons of ideology and of public security.
Islam is an immigrant religion, and the fear of Islam has taken hold of Belgian
public opinion since 19862. Since then, immigrants and Islam are considered po-
tential “threats” which require state control. This security-oriented approach has
never disappeared ever since the institutionalization of the MEB in 1999. This is
demonstrated by the practice of screening elected delegates by State Security. The
atmosphere continues to be dominated by suspicion, and even more so since 11
September 2001 (Bousetta 2002) and with the recent radicalization of some
Muslims.
The conflict between the state and local Muslim communities was at its worst
when the government relieved the Islamic and Cultural Center of its re-
sponsibilities and created the Provisional Council of Elders. Distrusting the
mosques, the government didnnt allow them any role in organizing their own
religion. By setting up the Provisional Council of Elders, it created an interlocutor
in its own image, and by doing so, it cut itself off fromMuslims. The state showed
contempt not only for the mosques but also for Muslims, by creating an artificial
body with no legitimacy which undermined Muslim religious identity.
The delay in settling the matter was also due to a lack of consensus at the heart
of the political parties. The liberal and therefore secularist ministers who had
responsibility for this issue during the 1980s rarely showed any conciliation to-
wards theMuslim communities. The lack of a political solutionwas no problem for
anyone except a small marginalized group, namely the teachers of Islamic reli-
gious education who did not enjoy the same status as their colleagues from other
religions, and the imams who still didnnt receive a state salary. In 1989, the RCIP
proposal put the question back on the political agenda although its substance was
fiercely criticized, especially by liberal and socialist secularists. From when it was
first set up, the CEOOR took this issue in hand and took up a mediating role
between theHighCouncil ofMuslims, unrecognized by the state, and theMinister
of Justice. Although it was not in conformity with the law, the electoral procedure
2 After American bombing on Tripoli resulting from increasing tensions between the
United States and Libya, some Muslims organize in Brussels a demonstration on April
20th, 1986. During this demonstration, some Muslims shout ”Allah UAkbar” and raise
portraits of Ayatollah Khomeiny and of Colonel Kaddhafi. For the Belgian media, this
was the starting point of the visibility of Muslim fundamentalism. (Dassetto / Bastenier
1987).
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of the High Council demonstrated a political legitimacy which the government
could not ignore. There therefore began a phase of negotiations which succeeded
in creating the Constituent Assembly. The Muslim Executive which was drawn
from this constituent assembly was set up inOctober 1994 for a period of one year
and was based on long negotiations amongst most of the factions present in the
Muslim communities (CEOOR 1995). The CEOOR proposed a pragmatic pro-
cedure to the Minister of Justice, which consisted in putting the working of the
executive to the test, and evaluating their activities.
The President of theExecutive, previously the President of theHighCouncil of
Muslims, encouraged the democratically elected High Council to change its
strategy in relation to the Belgian authorities and accept the mediation of the
Center, because he realized that Islam was not regarded sympathetically by the
Belgian population and that it would be better to pursue dialogue andnegotiation.
On the side of the political authorities, it was the directors of RCIP (Paula
DnHondt) and of CEOOR (Johan Leman), both close to the Flemish Christian
Democratic Party, who pushed for progress with two Ministers of Justice suc-
cessively, both of them also Christian Democrats. The Flemish Christian Demo-
cratMinister, StefanDeClerck,made the commitment to finding a solutionwhich
would require both new elections and a relative guarantee that religious ex-
tremists would be absent from the elected body. In other words, the government
followed the guidelines of the proposal from the RCIP, which it had not been
politically possible to implement at the time it was first put forward.
What led to the opening up of political opportunity? Three factors were es-
sential (Rea 2000). The first was the most institutional element of the repre-
sentation of Islam, namely the attitude of the High Council of Muslims, elected
but unrecognized. In its strategy it showed great pragmatism which fits relatively
well into the Belgian political ethos that avoids French-style ideological conflict.
In addition, the transition from confrontation to negotiation allowed the internal
organization of the diversity within the Muslim communities. Tactically, by
choosing as president a Belgian convert, the Muslim Council disarmed racist and
stigmatizing reactions. The second factor was the essential role played by the
RCIP and the CEOOR. Their work as brokers in this policy area between 1989
and 1998 allowed the creation of a space for discussion between the Muslim
leaders and the responsible politicians.However, their rolewas above all essential
in changing the focus of this policy. The Flemish Christian Democrat individuals
leading these two institutions and theChristianDemocratMinister, by presenting
the policy in terms of the objective of immigrant integration, rather than in terms
of recognition of a religion and thereby deepening the traditional confessional
cleavage of Belgian society, defused themost obvious objections of the secularists
in regard to this matter. Finally, the third, more structural factor was the trans-
formation of immigrants into Belgian citizens. Between 1991 and 2012 more than
750.000 foreigners became Belgian, and especially in Brussels where 200.000
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people with Moroccan and Turkish background became Belgian3. These people
are now a group of Belgian citizens of Muslim faith, Belgian citizens who un-
deniably have Muslim identity. The growth in the numbers of those who have
acquired Belgian nationality has stimulated something of a competition between
the political parties to attract this new electorate, including those parties which
were the most reluctant to recognize a Muslim leadership body (the francophone
socialists and the liberals). Since 1994, the number of Muslims elected to the
parliamentary assemblies has increased steadily and the voice of Belgians of
Muslim faith has grown more and more powerful (Jacobs et al. 2010).
5. Islam and Muslim leadership in Belgium
Islam became amajor religion in Belgium due to the arrival of immigrant workers
at the beginning of the 1960s. After the signature of bilateral agreements with
Morocco and Turkey in 1964, many immigrant workers from these two countries
settled in the three regions of Belgium.During the 1970s, family reunification and
the high birth rate of Moroccan and Turkish families led to a rapid increase in the
Muslim population. One of the features of Moroccan and Turkish immigration is
that it did not cease when labor immigration was brought to an end. More than
40 % of new residence permits granted each year are connected to family re-
unification (CEOOR 2013). Among these new arrivals, there are many Mo-
roccans andTurkswhoowe theirmobility to an internationalmarriage.Moreover,
there are also immigrants arriving from other countries with a Muslim majority:
Albania, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. However, the people coming from these
countries mostly arrive in Belgium as asylum seekers. In the absence of census
figures for the number of Muslims in Belgium, Hertogen (2008) proposed a
method based on two indicators. He identified the population having an immi-
gration background fromeachMuslim country and applied aweighting based on a
German survey measuring the proportion of people in Germany with that
background who identified themselves as Muslim (74 % for Turks, 73 % for
Moroccans). His data is from the year 20104. He estimated 685 684 Muslims
(315 580 of Moroccan origin, 174 656 of Turkish origin and 195 447 of other
nationalities). Thus an estimated 6.3 % of the Belgian population is Muslim:
4.5 % in Flanders, 4.4 % inWallonia and 22.4 % in Brussels. This method has two
biases: it ignores converts (Bousetta / Marchal 2003; Haddou 2012) and it
doesnnt allow for the enormous diversity in the day-to-day practice of Islamwhich
has been demonstrated by other research (Dassetto 2011; Torrekens / Adam
2015).
3 Centre pour lngalit des chances et la lutte contre le racisme, Migrations et pop-
ulations issues de lgimmigration en Belgique, 2013.
4 http://www.npdata.be/BuG/186-Aantal-moslims-gemeenten.
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According to theMuslimExecutive ofBelgiumns figures5, there are 68mosques
in Brussels of which 10 are recognized by the state, 76 mosques in Wallonia of
which 43 are recognized, and 165 in Flanders of which 28 are recognized. For the
81mosques recognized by the regions, the federal government pays the salaries of
70 imams. However, not all mosques want to be recognized by the state. In fact,
some refuse state scrutiny and donnt apply to be recognized by theMEB. They are
financed either by theirmembers, or by foreign states,mostly SaudiArabia via the
World Islamic League. The donor has considerable influence over the choice of
imam, the theological line, the teaching.
TheMoroccanmosques areMaliki Sunnis and the Turkishmosques areHanafi
Sunni. The other traditions of Islam (Shiite, Sufi, Alevi, Suleymani, etc.) are only
present in very small numbers (El Battiui / Kanmaz 2004).However,many studies
have shown the growing influence of the Muslim Brothers, of Wahhabism and of
Salafism in some Moroccan mosques (Marchal 2008; Dassetto 2011). These
mosques join together in umbrella organizations. The Diyanet managed by the
Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, linked to the Turkish state, brings to-
gether half of the Turkish mosques whose management in Belgium is in the hands
of the Turkish IslamicReligious Foundation. This group comprises 68mosques, of
which 40 are recognized (Husson / Mandin 2014). The recognized mosques which
belong to the Diyanet do not apply for salaries for their imams from the federal
state. They receive imams made available by the Diyanet to serve three-year
terms. These imams are paid by the Diyanet at a more generous level than that
provided by Belgian legislation. The Diyanet also makes financial contributions
to its mosques and plays an important role in political representation. The Union
of Muslims of Belgium (Rassemblement des Musulmans de Belgique) is an um-
brella organization that coordinates the activities of mosques which are members
of the Muslim Executive of Belgium (MEB) and promotes the training of new
leaders, imams and teachers. It is essentially a grouping ofMoroccanmosques and
it maintains privileged links with the highest political and religious Moroccan
authorities. There are other smaller umbrella organizations serving mosques ac-
cording to their theological traditions or the nationality of theirmembers (Husson
2007; Husson / Dury 2006).
The federal state finances 17 Muslim prison counselors. These Muslim coun-
selors have been trained by theMEB for the religious dimension of their work and
by public institutions for legal and social matters. However, the largest public
contribution is the salaries of teachers of Islamic religious education in state
schools. There are almost 300 teachers employed in state schools in Flanders and
400 in the francophone part of the country. For almost 20 years, the political
debate on leadership training has centered on teachers of Islamic religious edu-
cation (Boender / Kanmaz 2002). To meet the requirement to organize religious
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teachers in fromabroadwhodidnnt speak any of the official languages of Belgium.
Most of them did not have the required qualifications and were granted exemp-
tion from the usual requirements for reasons of urgency. During the 1990s, in the
absence of a representative leadership body, an advisory body appointed by the
state managed appointments of teachers of Islamic religious education and lim-
ited the numbers of teachers arriving from abroad. Between 1993 and 1997, the
Flemish government created an evening course made up of classes in theology,
teaching methodology and language. The teachers who refused to take the exam
were no longer employed. The interventionism of the Flemish government was
also demonstrated by the initiative taken to support a Flemish training scheme for
teachers of Islamic religious education. Since 1998, in collaboration with the
MEB, the Erasmus University College has offered a three-year bachelor course
forwhich studentsmust study three subjects, one ofwhich is Islam. The design and
teaching of the course in Muslim theology and Koranic studies are the responsi-
bility of two teachers nominated by the MEB. The principal challenge was to
construct a training course for future teachers of Islamic religious education with
the MEB in collaboration with institutions of higher education.
InWallonia-Brussels, there has not been a comparable experience. Most of the
teachers have not had training in the study of religion and of Islam, except for the
Turkish teachers whoweremostly trained in Turkey.Most of themhave amasterns
degree from a Belgian university and a diploma of competence to teach Islamic
religious education from the MEB. The institutions of higher education and the
MEB offer further training and professional development conferences. Since
2014, the MEB has initiated discussions with the Theology Faculty of the Uni-
versit Catholique de Louvain (UCL) with a view to creating an option in Islamic
religious education as part of the universityns teacher training course. The design
of the course program and the nomination of teachers of Islamic religious edu-
cation depend on the MEB. Unlike what has happened in Flanders, in this case
there was no state-led initiative, but rather direct contact between the MEB and
UCL. Apart from this, the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the
Contemporary World at UCL has run a course on Islamic religious studies since
2004, which also includes classes in theology taught by professors from abroad.
While the MEB is the official interlocutor of the state, it is not a permanent
base for academic study of Islam. The training courses are offered on a one-off
basis. The vision of theMEB is to set up a university faculty of Islamic theology on
themodel of the university faculty of Protestant theology inBrussels, autonomous
but recognized by the state. At present the MEB is also in competition with
training courses organized by private institutions, some of which offer “university
qualifications”, which however are not officially recognized by the state. These
private institutions include in particular the Islamic Faculty of Europe6, which has
6 http://www.ifeg.be.
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one branch in Flanders and another in Brussels7, and the Alkhayria Belgica8
association, which owns a European Academy of Culture and Islamic Studies in
Belgium. These two institutions offer a “university qualification” made up of
three years at bachelorns level and two years at masterns level. They also organize
various cycles of conferences. The oldest training course in Islamic studies is
validated by the European Islamic Institute of the Islamic and Cultural Center of
Belgium9. The target groups these institutions aim to provide for are imams,
teachers of Islamic religious education and Muslim counselors (Piqueray / Non-
neman / Timmerman 2009, p. 12–13).
The training of these three “professions” (imam, teacher of Islamic religious
education andMuslim counselors) is constantly on the political agenda and at the
heart of many political debates and public initiatives. However, it is especially the
training of imams that is currently on the political agenda. The public authorities
are seeking to support the MEB in its vision of creating a training center for
Muslim leadership, but they are also launching initiatives in associationwithMEB
to compete with the many private initiatives that are not controlled by the state
andwhose normative, religious and political orientations are suspect in the eyes of
some politicians. However, a central question remains, which is that of the le-
gitimacy of state involvement to promote the emergence of a training center for
Islamic studies centered on theology.
6. Legitimacy of state involvement in the training of religious
leaders
The question of the training of religious leaders is intimately linked to the ques-
tion of the relationship between religions and the state. In Belgium, the state does
not set any particular conditions for the training of ministers of religion, leaving
religious bodies the responsibility for setting their own standards and require-
ments. This leads to awide variety of approaches fromone religion to another and
sometimes also within a single religion. This noninterference by the state in re-
ligious matters is historically a relatively recent phenomenon. In many European
countries, systems of regulation of the training of religious leaders in general and
ministers of religion in particular continued up to the nineteenth century, for
example the policy of Joseph II, Emperor of the Habsburg Empire (Kossmann
1988, p. 54) or that of the consulate of Napolon Bonaparte (Messner 2010).
Compliance with two principles justifies intervention by the state: ministers of
religion must contribute to the maintenance of “public order” and “religious
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training. The question is always in which aspect of the training should the state be
involved: theological knowledge or social and civic training? Training of Muslim
leaders is on the political agenda mainly because of questions raised about
compliance with these two principles. After 9/11 many reports, including some
commissioned by the government, showed the dangers which could be stirred up
by the teaching of some imams on the subject of maintaining public order and
religious peace, to which was now added the fight against radicalism.
The report of the Commission of Intercultural Dialogue set up by the federal
government, in February 2004, formulated recommendations for “living togeth-
er”. Among these recommendations was the creation of a Belgian Institute of
Islam and a Center of Interfaith Studies to promote dialogue between religious,
secularist and other traditions. This should be a “center of research and teaching
where people could study on the one hand the methods and rules of Islamic
jurisprudence (ijtihaad, usul al fiqh) and the interpretation of religious sources
(Koran and Sunnah), and on the other hand the socio-historic dimension of this
juridical and theological heritage. This center would combine academic and ed-
ucational approaches” (Delruelle / Torfs 2005, p. 8). It would also be a public
meeting place. However, the justification for this center rested on a double-sided
argument: promoting the exchange between diverse currents within Islam and
fighting against fundamentalism and radicalism. The report once again makes
clear the nonintervention of the state in religious affairs while adding, “That does
not mean that religious freedom has no limits”.
While one of the arguments justifying the possible interference of public au-
thorities in themanagement of religion is that of maintenance of public order and
religious peace, a new argument was put forward in the report of the Commission
Responsible for the Status of Ministers of Recognized Religions10 (2006). The
involvement of the state could be justified on the grounds that the state finances
ministers of religion who according to article 181 of the Constitution offer “moral
assistance”. This legal provision allows the state to expect certain “vocational
skills”.While article 21 of the Constitution forbids the state to involve itself in the
training of ministers of religion, article 181 does not forbid it to be concerned with
the standards of training of ministers of religion, given that their salaries are
justified in terms of “moral assistance”. In addition to the two traditional argu-
ments relevant to “religious policing” (Boudon 2002), the report adds this more
instrumental argument. Because the state pays their salaries, ministers of religion
have to meet “quality standards”. This argument ultimately leads to proposing
supervision of ministers of religion. The report declares the commissionns com-
plete satisfaction with the standards of training in all religions except for Islam. It
states thus: “the necessary requirements in respect of the training of imams are at
times uncertain, and above all, the conditions under which this training is carried
out are altogether imprecise, disparate and, more seriously, badly adapted to the
10 Commission made up of academic experts.
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needs of the Muslim community of Belgium, according to the representatives
heard by the commission” (p. 32). The commission therefore proposed the cre-
ation of Muslim theology colleges in Belgium responsible for the training of
imams.
Political initiatives in Flanders
Following the reports of the two commissions, the Flemish authorities went
straight into action. A first report (Piqueray / Nonneman / Timmerman 2008)
consisted of a feasibility study on the provision of training for all Muslim leaders.
The main conclusions of the report showed the existence, amongst a part of the
Muslim community, of the desire for a “Flemish imamsn training course”. The
unstated understanding was that there is an essential commitment to have imams
better trained than those currently in office, by giving them an academic training.
However, the content and the partnership involved in the creation of this
“Flemish imamsn training course” remained very vague. The report insisted on the
necessity of receiving recognition from the MEB, to offer a qualification com-
parable to the high level courses available in countries such as Turkey and Mo-
rocco. This proposal does not rule out the need to establish this course in con-
sultation with the countries of origin.
The Flemish government of 2009–2014 put this matter back on the political
agenda. They wanted to achieve the result of a qualification for imams in con-
sultation with the representatives of the Islamic faith11. As so often, the govern-
ment proceeded in two steps. Firstly they commissioned a study carried out by
Debeer, Loobuyck&Meier (2011) in order to refine the analysis of the training of
imams, in particular in a comparativeEuropean perspective, and secondly they set
up a commission to make recommendations to the government. The commission
was made of members of ministerial cabinets (“Education and Training” and
“Citizenship and Integration”), representatives from the universities and repre-
sentatives of theMuslim community, including theMEB. The commission had the
task of defining the training needs for Muslim leaders and proposing possible
organizational structures for a “Flemish imamsn training course”. Given the dif-
ficulties involved, the commission suggested that the work should proceed in
stages.
In the short term, they proposed investment in the training of Muslim lead-
ership at an academic level by offering them a specific teacher training course. In
the medium term, it would be advisable to invest in professionalization programs
for imams currently active in Flanders, by making use of Dutch language courses,
by developing non-religious higher education courses for imams, and by devel-
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oping citizenship courses for imams. The memorandum to the Flemish govern-
ment12 specified that “the professionalization programs have the objective of
supporting current ministers of religion in order to strengthen their ties with the
society in which they live and work”. Finally, in the long term, the commission
suggested investing in a complete university course in Islamic religious studies and
facilitating the collaboration between higher education and the Flemish imamsn
training course.
Since 2014, courses in Islamic studies have begun to be offered at university
level. The Katholiek Universiteit Leuven (KUL) has organized this by including
an option of Islamic theology and religious studies in a one-yearmasterns course in
world religions, interreligious dialogue and religious studies. This option makes
available a basic training in Islamic theology and religious studies. It is particularly
envisaged forMuslim counselors and teachers of Islamic religious education but is
definitely not a training course for imams or a complete academic program in
Islamic theology and religious studies.
Political initiatives in the Wallonia-Brussels Federation
The question of training for Muslim leaders was on the political agenda of the
government of the Wallonia-Brussels Federation during 2009–2014. The gov-
ernment proceeded in the same way as the Flemish government. In the course of
their term of office, they commissioned a feasibility study with a view to “the
creation of a public institute for Islamic studies” (Husson /Mandrin 2014). For the
government, this institute would be intended for imams and teachers of Islamic
religious education and would be responsible for delivering a religious training
course integrating the values of equality and liberty. The report presented a re-
view of the existing courses and formulated various possible scenarios for the
future. It advocated “the emergence of a European (or Belgian) Islam”.
The report emphasized the necessity for a training course for Muslim leader-
ship to cover the religious aspect and social and civic aspect, including language
classes. One of the preferred routes would be an interdisciplinary masterns in-
cluding one or more university certificates and a professional development pro-
gram. This masterns could be jointly organized by various universities in the
Wallonia-Brussels federation and coordinated by a permanent body (an NGO or
a public body). This route is however only achievable with the involvement of the
Muslim communities, and in particular the MEB, and with due respect to the
academic freedom of the universities. On this basis, the government set up a
commission made up of representatives of the universities, experts, and repre-
12 Een opleidingsaanbod islamitische theologie en godsdienstwetenschappen op uni-
versitair niveau en een professionaliseringsaanbod voor imams, memorandumbyMinister
Smet to the Flemish Government 12 July 2013.
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sentatives of Muslim communities drawn from the MEB. Unlike the Flemish
commission, there were nomembers ofministerial cabinets included. Thework of
the commission will be completed in November 2015. The debates have followed
similar lines to those in Flanders: step-wise development towards the goal of an
autonomous training institution and development of projects in collaboration
between the MEB and the universities, especially UCL, which has been working
in this area for a long time.
7. Religion as security issue
The Constitution enshrines the settlement between the state and religions. Al-
though we are no longer in the era of “policing of religions” (Boudon 2002),
multiple political actions and declarations show that in the specific case of Islam,
religious questions are treated as security matters. On the occasion of various
sometimes tragic events such as the killing committed at the Jewish Museum of
Belgium inMay 2014, but also the departure of youngMuslims to fight in Syria in
2013, the incitement to hatred promoted by the groupSharia4Belgium in 2013, the
Muslim radicalization in the prisons in 2013, and the expression of Muslim radi-
calism following the killing at Charlie Hebdo in 2015, political responses have
been hardline and security-oriented. The suspicion with regard to the teaching of
some radical imams has been expressed explicitly and the state, while recognizing
that it cannot comment on the religious content of sermons, reaffirms that these
may not express ideas contrary to the law and the Constitution. Training for
imams is considered as an instrument with which to combat Muslim fundamen-
talism and radicalism, especially among the young. Thus the training of imams is
part of a logic of security and not one of raising their educational standards
(Frgosi 2004; Zemni 2006). For the political authorities, these political actions
and declarations do not infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of
state and religion. Indeed, this separation is only achievable if two of the con-
ditions it is based upon are respected: religions must secure “public order” and
“religious peace”. The events which have taken place in Belgium and in Europe
lead to the view that these conditions are not fulfilled. This justifies public in-
tervention and a response in terms of internal state security. To this is added the
argument advanced by the Council of Elders which maintains that the state is
entitled to expect professional standards of ministers of religion in their work of
moral assistance, in exchange for the payment of their salaries.
Since the events of Charlie Hebdo, the federal state and the regions have
implemented programs to combat radicalism. Public interventionism has also
beenmarked at the regional level, responsible for the recognition of mosques and
for leadership training. Comparison between the policies of Flanders and of
Wallonia-Brussels reveals the same opposition as that observed by Ilke Adam
(2013) in the matter of immigrant integration. The policy is more interventionist
76
Andrea Rea
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
in Flanders and more laisser-faire in the francophone part of the country. The
security component of the policy is seen in Flanders in the law for the recognition
of places of worship. Thus, one of the criteria for recognition is that the local
community should reject any individual who acts in violation of the Constitution
or of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. This criterion is not present in the laws of the Brussels Capital Region
and the Walloon Region. Likewise, imams who do not have Belgian citizenship
must participate in the mandatory integration program in Flanders. This too is a
criterion for the recognition of a place ofworship. The dimension of assimilation is
much more strongly emphasized in public discourse in Flanders, where lack of
knowledge of the Dutch language is a major problem among the imams, also
denounced by imams such as Brahim Laytouss13, adding to the justification for
public intervention.
The initiatives taken by the Flemish and francophone governments have often
been criticized on the grounds of the lack of respect for the separation of state and
religion, especially on the francophone side. For example, the Islam specialist
Felice Dassetto (2014) wrote on his blog that the project in theWallonia-Brussels
federation revives the “Josephinist policy” of religion which contravenes the
principle of the separation of state and religion. Jean-Philippe Schreiber (2015)
founder of a masterns in studies of religions and secularism at the Universit libre
de Bruxelles (ULB) shares the same analysis and describes the project as “neo-
gallicanism”. In contrast, some Muslim elites have celebrated the public inter-
vention and formulated radical proposals (mandatory recognition for allmosques,
preaching only in the official languages of Belgium, university qualifications for
all imams, etc.) to construct a Belgian Islam for which one of the objectives is to
end the superintendence that some foreign countries exercise over Belgian
mosques.
Public interventionism is alsomade possible by the climate of Islamophobia, by
the fragmentation of the Muslim community and the institutional fragility of the
MEB. Islam is a minority religion and one that is strongly marginalized in the
context of multiple controversies (veil, reasonable accommodation, etc.). In this
context, it is difficult to propose an alternative to the discourse of security for-
mulated by the political authorities and supported by public opinion. The sur-
veillance practices, such as screening, have also generated distrust of the political
authorities within the Muslim communities. In addition, as noted by Farid El
Asri14, the “prominence of security” in political discourse and action leads Mus-
lims to feel that they are the victims of discrimination and creates distrust towards
any political initiative coming from above.
13 Het Nieuwsblad, 19/01/2015.
14 ElAsri, F. (2013, 10 septembre). “La formation des imams enBelgique: pas si vite!”
in La Libre Belgique. 10 September 2013, available at http://www.lalibre.be/debats/
opinions/la-formation-des-imams-en-belgique-pas-si-vite-522e947235703d8e48d3f2b1.
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The fragmentation of the Muslim community stems from the diversity of its
religious and national roots. There areMuslim communities which have grown up
from the grassroots, in local communities. These communities also embrace a
wide diversity of religious practice as well as a diversity of expectations, especially
on the part of the imams, who vary a great deal. The younger generations of
Muslims are more educated than their parents. Their expectations of the imams
are much higher. They are searching for an intense spirituality that they do not
always find in the mosques (Husson / Mandrin 2014; Torrekens / Adam 2015), or
in imamswho have had a limited education in Islamic religious studies, or in those
offering a dogmatic approach to the faith. They are looking for imams who un-
derstand the daily lives of their faithful and respond to their preoccupations. Some
Muslims also expect imams to have the skills to get involved in the life of society
(Mukadam / Scoot-Baumann 2010) and in social organization (Jouanneau 2013).
Finally, there is also a strong expectation of a deep knowledge of scripture and of
the contextualization of Islam in Europe. These expectations show the existence
of another cleavage in the Muslim communities: a generational cleavage. These
multiple cleavages dividing the Muslim communities make it more difficult to
construct a consensual ideal of what an imam should be and how he/she should be
trained.
Finally, political interventionism is also a result of the weak legitimacy of the
MEB. The successive crises within the MEB especially at the time of the 2005
elections have weakened its power and its credibility among the Muslim com-
munities and in respect of the political authorities. While the 2014 elections were
calmer, the fact that a significant number of members of the MEB come from
unrecognized mosques or mosques that chose to remain unrecognized raises
questions. The MEB wants to get away from its paternalist reputation but has
difficulty in formulating a plan for trainingwhich could be recognized by the state.
This is due to the total lack of consensus within the MEB on this subject. The
president of the MEB wanted the subject of imamsn training to be excluded from
the debates of the commissions (Schreiber 2015) which were set up in Flanders
and Wallonia-Brussels, whereas the president of the Congregation of Muslims in
Belgium (Dassetto 2014) was pleased that it was included. But the deepest in-
ternal division is that between the Moroccans and the Turks. The Moroccan
representatives want a university faculty of Islamic studies which would also
maintain contacts with the universities of the Arab world, whereas the Turkish
representatives linked to theDiyanet do notwant this. The latter are satisfiedwith
the current situation whereby imams, even young Turks born in Belgium, follow
training courses in Turkey and are then paid by the Turkish state for their work in
the role of imam. This internal dissension has caused deadlock and creates the
opportunity for state intervention. This shows again the weight of the countries of
origin on this sensitive question of imamsn training.
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Conclusion
The training ofMuslim leadership, and above all of imams, is a big issue inEurope.
The proposals that are currently emerging from the initiatives taken by the Bel-
gian political authorities in collaboration with the MEB and the universities are
leading towards training programs for Muslim leadership, with the exception of
imams. This is ultimately fairly similar to what has happened in France (Stras-
bourg, Paris, and Bordeaux). These are general training courses aiming to give an
understanding of Islam but none of them is a university-level course for imams.
There are two other models in Europe: the German model and the Dutch model
(Messner 2015; Fuess 2011; Heuts / Klaver / Van der welle 2012). The German
model consists in creating institutes of Muslim theology within the university,
offering bachelorns and masterns degree courses. At some German universities,
endowed chairs for Islamic theology are financed by third parties, among them the
Turkish governmental council for religious affairs. This limits chances for the
emergence of a European Islam because of its dependence on the country of
origin. TheDutchmodel consists in offering a full university programput together
in collaboration with Islamic associations but not with the representatives of
Islamic communities. If the programs are too general, this can lead Muslims to
discredit the model and turn to other training programs. The plans in Belgium are
navigating between these two approaches.
Whichever model is chosen, there remains an essential problem which should
not be lost fromviewduring the construction of a training program for imams. The
training of imams does not lead them automatically to be appointed to a position.
As for Protestants and Jews, and in contrast to Catholics, it is local communities
who choose theirministers of religion and not the religious hierarchywhich in fact
does not exist. Even if a candidate imamhas followed a training course recognized
by the representative leadership body and the state, he still has to be accepted by
the faithful. Therefore all plans for training for imams absolutely must take ac-
count of the expectations of local communities and of the faithful.
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